Do as I say or do as I do? How social relationships shape the impact of descriptive and injunctive norms of voting. by Fieldhouse, Edward & Cutts, David
 
 
University of Birmingham
Do as I say or do as I do?  How social relationships
shape the impact of descriptive and injunctive
norms of voting.
Fieldhouse, Edward; Cutts, David
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Fieldhouse, E & Cutts, D 2020, 'Do as I say or do as I do? How social relationships shape the impact of
descriptive and injunctive norms of voting.', British Journal of Political Science.
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 14. Jun. 2020
1 
 
Do as I say or do as I do?  How social relationships shape the impact of descriptive and 
injunctive norms of voting.  
 
Edward Fieldhouse and David Cutts 
 
Abstract 
Social norms play an important role in our understanding of why people vote, yet there is 
very little known about the relative importance of descriptive and injunctive norms for voter 
turnout or how normative influence is affected by the political and social relationship 
between citizens.  Using political discussion network data from the British Election Study we 
examine the joint effect of descriptive and injunctive norms on turnout. We demonstrate that 
citizens follow the example of those closest to them (descriptive norms), especially their 
partner, but they also respond to social approval of voting from political discussants 
regardless of the nature of their relationship 
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Introduction 
There is widespread agreement that social norms play an important role in explaining why 
people vote (Blais, 2000). Without reference to norms political scientists have struggled to 
explain why people should vote at all (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). Despite this, the literature 
on voter turnout has yet to establish properly the relative extent to which descriptive and 
injunctive norms matter, both separately and in combination; and whether this is conditional 
on the nature of the relationship between political discussants. Most existing research on norms 
of voting has focussed on the role of civic duty, which can be thought of as a personal normative 
belief rather than a social norm (Bicchieri, 2017). The weight placed on civic duty in the 
political science literature, compared to relational measures of norms, largely reflects a greater 
availability of individual level survey data compared to social network data. When comparisons 
of descriptive and injunctive norms of voting have been made, the role of descriptive norms 
has generally been given precedent (e.g. Glynn, Huge and Lunney, 2009).  
In this article, we use political discussion network data to examine the role of injunctive and 
descriptive norms on voter turnout. We make three important contributions to the study of voter 
turnout. First, using theoretical insights from social psychology (Bicchieri, 2005, 2017), by 
explicitly separating the role of empirical and normative expectations and personal normative 
beliefs we make a theoretical distinction which should be incorporated into future research on 
turnout. Second we introduce new and unique empirical evidence regarding the relative 
importance of these concepts. Contrary to prevalent evidence and assumptions we show that, 
even when you allow for the role of civic duty and descriptive norms, injunctive norms, which 
have frequently been dismissed as secondary to descriptive norms, play an important role in 
voter turnout.  Third, by examining the joint effect of injunctive and descriptive norms on 
turnout, we show, for the first time, that citizens not only follow the example of those closest 
to them, but they also respond to social approval of voting from political discussants regardless 
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of the nature of their relationship. More generally, we suggest that the theoretical and empirical 
lessons of this research can be extended beyond the sub-field of voter turnout to political 
behaviour more generally.  
Norms and turnout  
One of the greatest puzzles of political behaviour has been why should citizens vote when, in 
most elections, they will have almost no chance of determining the outcome  (Riker and 
Ordeshook, 1968). Perhaps the most influential and persuasive solution to this paradox has 
been the introduction of a consumption element to voting which is not dependent on the 
outcome, the most frequently cited of which is the notion of duty (Fiorina, 1976). However, 
although research consistently shows civic duty to be correlated with voter turnout (Blais, 
2000) this may be little more than tautology. The inclusion of civic duty simply shifts the puzzle 
from why people vote to why people believe it is the duty to vote (Barry, 1970). The answer to 
this latter puzzle lies in social norms (Coleman, 1990).  
Much of the literature on social norms of voting has focussed on what social psychologists 
refer to as personal normative beliefs (Bicchieri, 2017), especially civic duty. For example, 
according to Blais (2000), what matters is not so much the threat of disapproval but rather the 
personal belief that voting is a moral obligation. Such normative beliefs may reflect internalised 
norms, in this case the belief that voting is a citizen’s civic duty.  More generally, they represent 
how a person believes they ought to behave, which may reflect moral or prudential motivations 
as well as social ones. In other words, normative beliefs are not conditional on what others do. 
In order to understand the importance of norms in voter turnout it is necessary to differentiate 
between these normative beliefs, and social norms.  A definition of social norms that makes 
this distinction is provided by Bicchieri (2005, p. 11) 
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A social norm is a rule of behaviour that individuals prefer to conform to conform to 
it on condition that they believe that (a) most people in their reference network 
conform to it (empirical expectation), and (b) that most people in their reference 
network believe they ought to conform to it (normative expectation).  
A descriptive norm exists when there is a preference to conform to how others behave (there 
is an empirical expectation). In the case of voting, this would mean that a citizen believes that 
other people in her reference group vote. Descriptive norms provide a cognitive shortcut when 
one is choosing how to behave in a given situation (Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno, 1991) and 
may involve both coordination (e.g. for example driving on the correct side of the road)  and 
imitation (e.g. copying  successful behaviours) (Bicchieri, 2017).  A descriptive norm means 
that behaviour is conditional only on empirical expectations. That is, a person prefers to vote 
if people in their relevant reference network vote. In contrast, an injunctive norm exists if a 
behaviour is conditional on normative expectations. In other words, it relies on a perception of 
how others believe one should behave and involves social approval or disapproval. In the case 
of an injunctive norm of voting this means that other people in social network think that one 
ought to vote and this is be reflected in social approval of voting or disproval of abstention.1 It 
is quite possible for a descriptive norm to exist without an injunctive norm, although they are 
likely to exist simultaneously.2   
The important distinction between normative beliefs and social norms – both descriptive and 
normative – is that social norms are conditional on the behaviour of others (Rolfe, 2012; 
                                                          
1 In some contexts the reverse,  an injunctive norm of not voting, could exist whereby discussants disapprove of 
voting and approve of abstention (Partheymüller and Schmitt-Beck, 2012) 
2 For example, George is aware that most of his friends vote and as a result he believes that this is a good (or 
normal) thing to do. George also likes to fit in with his friends and be like them by voting for the Labour Party. 
There is a descriptive norm is that that most of his friends vote, so he will too. If he thinks they will not bother he 
would most likely make the same decision (i.e. George’s turnout is conditional on empirical expectations). However, 
most of his friends have never expressed any opinion that George ought to vote. We would therefore say that there 
is a descriptive norm of voting but not an injunctive one. Now imagine that some of George’s friends frequently tell 
him that he would be not doing his duty if he did not vote: he would be letting down the Labour Party and they 
would be disappointed with him. He feels pressured by this. We might now say that there is also an injunctive norm 
of voting. 
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Bicchieri, 2017). In contrast, a personal normative belief, such as civic duty, is not conditional 
on social expectations:  those who strongly believe that voting is a duty would prefer to vote 
regardless of their expectations of others (Bicchieri, 2017).  To understand and assess the 
impact of norms on voting behaviour we need to measure three different concepts. 
(i) Personal normative belief:  I think one should vote. 
(ii) Empirical expectation: most people in my reference network vote. 
(iii) Normative expectation: I believe most people in my reference network think one 
should vote. 
While there is a widespread assumption in the turnout literature that descriptive norms matter 
more than injunctive norms (Rolfe, 2012), this is largely inferred from research into other 
behaviours, mainly from outside of political science (Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno, 1991). Very 
little research on turnout has actually made this distinction. Moreover, although there is 
considerable evidence of the impact of social pressure (Green and Gerber, 2010), evidence of 
the impact of descriptive norms of voting is rather limited. In field experiments which 
manipulate the descriptive norm of voting, the message that most people vote tends to increase 
the willingness of people to vote themselves (Gerber and Rogers, 2009). In the small number 
of cases in which researchers have examined the combined effect of injunctive and descriptive 
norms of voting the result are mixed. Some studies have found that descriptive norms of voting 
are more important than injunctive norms (Blais, 2000; Glynn, Huge and Lunney, 2009). One 
recent study found that “most people are not subjected to strong injunctive pressure” and that 
“descriptive norms seem to be even more important than injunctive norms” (Blais, Galais and 
Coulombe, 2018, pp. 10–11). In contrast, Panagopoulos (2014)  found evidence for injunctive 
norms but not of descriptive norms, and no evidence of an interaction between the two. Others 
have found a moderating effect at the dyadic level: that the influence of injunctive norms is 
conditional on the presence of consistent descriptive norms (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009). In other 
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words, the influence of social pressure to vote from a discussant will be more influential if that 
discussant votes themselves.  
The intimacy of the relationship between discussants is also likely to be relevant to the 
influence of social norms of voting because closer discussant especially  family members are 
more likely to observe whether or not the subject votes and therefore to apply sanctions (show 
disapproval) in the event of non-voting (Coleman, 1990; Abrams et al, 2011). It is therefore 
important to allow for variation in the impact of social norms across different types of social 
relationship. We therefore propose the following hypotheses. 
1. Respondents with (more) discussants who vote (empirical expectations) will be more 
likely to vote themselves. 
2. Respondents with (more) discussants who care whether the respondent votes 
(normative expectations) will be more likely to vote themselves. 
3. The impact of normative and empirical expectations varies by social relationship. 
4. The impact of normative expectations is moderated by empirical expectations. 
Data and methods                                                                                         
We draw on data from wave 2 of the British Election Study internet panel (Fieldhouse et al, 
2015), carried out in May-June 2014, which included a specially designed module on political 
discussion designed to test social influences on turnout. The data set contains 30,895 individual 
respondents including 25,387 who named at least one political discussant, which formed the 
basis of a one-with-many dyadic design (Kenny et al, 2006). In total there were 56,282 dyads. 
Discussants were identified by a name generator approach, with respondents directed to think 
of three people that they talk to about politics (following a question about frequency of political 
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discussion).3 Our key concepts are measured at two levels of analysis:  the network (one for 
each respondent) and the dyad (one for each discussant). To measure normative expectations 
or injunctive norms at the dyadic level respondents were asked the question “Do you think this 
person cares whether or not you voted in the European Elections?” of each discussant. At the 
network level, responses to this question were aggregated across all respondents in the network. 
Empirical expectations or descriptive norms were measured at the dyadic level using the 
question: “As far as you know, did each of these people vote in the recent European 
Elections?” At the network level, responses were again aggregated across all discussants.  
Personal normative beliefs were measured using a standard indicator of civic duty, which 
captures agreement with the statement “It is every citizen's duty to vote in an election”.  
We cannot assume that empirical and normative expectations are independent of each other. 
Each of our survey instruments are as perceived by the respondent and it seems plausible that 
respondents might base their assessments of social approval on knowledge of the behaviour of 
their discussants (which is more easily observable). Our data confirms that respondents are 
much more likely to perceive injunctive norms if they believe that their discussant voted 
themselves. Respondents largely believe that their discussants would expect them to ‘practice 
what they preach’: when considering discussants who they believe voted, respondents thought 
that 69% of those discussants cared whether the respondent voted. This compares to only 20% 
of discussants who did not vote. When assessing the impact of normative expectations it is 
therefore important to control for empirical expectations and their interactive effect, since 
perceived approval is dependent on whether the discussant is a voter. 
                                                          
3 The wording of the question is as follows: ‘Can you think of anyone you sometimes talk to about politics? 
These people might or might not be relatives. *Provide up to three names starting from the top box. For 
example, if you only to talk to one person please fill in the top box, if you talk to two people please fill in the top 
two boxes, if you do not talk to anybody please skip the question.* (If you prefer, you can provide a nickname 
or initials).’ 
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To test the extent to which the impact of injunctive and descriptive norms depends on the 
relationship between discussants, respondents were asked about their relationship with each 
discussant. The most commonly identified discussants were spouses, followed by other family 
and then friends with neighbours and co-workers making up the smallest group. While we are 
mainly interested in the differential impact of social norms rooted in different social 
relationships it is important to note that the exposure to those norms may also by the nature of 
the relationship. Our data confirms a correlation between relationship type and injunctive 
norms, with spouses bring the most likely to be thought to approve of voting (62%), followed 
by other family members (50%) and friends (44%). Neighbours and co-workers were least 
likely to be perceived to care (29%).  
Modelling strategy 
There are two key steps in the modelling strategy. First, we model whether or not the 
respondents voted according to characteristics of their network as well as their own 
characteristics (H1 and H2). In the second stage, we focus on the dyadic relationship between 
discussants and respondents. Although this requires removing the dyads from the context of 
the network, by focussing on interpersonal influence, we are able to explore how the impact of 
normative expectations varies according to the relationship between the respondent and the 
discussant (hypotheses 3 and 4).  
Hypotheses 1-2 are tested using standard logistic regression models at the respondent or 
network level. The key explanatory variables are respondent level empirical and normative 
expectations as described above. Because different respondents named different numbers of 
discussants, we stratify the models by the number of discussants in the network so that we do 
not conflate the number of discussants who vote or care about voting with the size of the 
network. We focus mainly on the three-discussant networks as they contain the most 
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information, but it is important to compare with smaller networks in case three person networks 
are unusual in anyway. Overall 70% of networks contain three discussants, 18% two, and 12% 
only one discussant. These models include a number of controls at the respondent level 
consistent with individual level predictors of voter turnout (Smets and Van Ham, 2013). This 
is important because numerous respondent characteristics may also influence the selection of 
discussants and the perception of their social norms. Crucially we include civic duty, which 
allows us to control for the possibility that perceiving a social norm in others may be related to 
personal normative beliefs. This variable is measured at the previous wave of the panel (wave 
1) to minimise the possibility that our measure of normative beliefs is a reflection of perceived 
injunctive norms.  Additionally, we control for whether any of the discussants asked the 
respondent to vote.4 This enables us to separate the impact of inter-personal mobilization 
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) or a companion effect (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2012) from the 
co-ordination, informational or normative effects of empirical expectations. We also control 
for strength of party identification (also lagged), political attention (lagged), political efficacy 
(lagged), party mobilization (measured as campaign contact), age, gender, education, marital 
status, and the number of days on which the respondent typically discusses politics. The latter 
is important because frequency of political discussion is closely related to the selection of 
discussants (e.g. how likely they are to care) and the number of discussants the respondent 
selects.5  
In the second stage, we again use a logistic regression model but this time stratified by 
relationship type such that each case represents a single dyad. This allows us to look at the 
                                                          
4 “Thinking back to the day of the elections on May 22nd, did any of these people ask you to go to vote 
together?” *Please tick all that apply.* 
5 In our data the average number of days discussing politics was 2.3 for respondents naming one discussant, 3.2 
for two discussants and 4.4 for three discussants. Our data also shows that perceived discussant approval 
increases with the frequency of discussion, with those discussing politics on a daily basis being more than three 
times as likely to perceive approval as those discussing politics less than once per week. 
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extent to which the impact of empirical and normative expectations vary by the nature of the 
relationship between respondent and discussant, and whether or not the impact of normative 
expectations are conditional on empirical expectations. Empirical and normative expectations 
are measured at the dyadic level as described above. In other words, do citizens consider 
whether their discussants expect them to ‘do as they say’ even if they do not do so themselves?  
To avoid using the same respondent more than once in each model we select the first instance 
of each relationship type named by each respondent. For example, in the friends model we take 
the first named friend of each respondent. The outcome variable is again turnout, and the key 
explanatory variables are dyadic normative and empirical expectations.  
In these models we include a product interaction between normative and empirical expectations 
to allow us test for the presence of an interactive as well as additive effect. It is well know that 
assessing interactions in logistic models is complicated by the effect of compression resulting 
from  the bounded nature of the outcome (Ai and Norton, 2003). In keeping with our theoretical 
expectations we include the product interaction terms in all the models regardless of 
conventional statistical significance because not only are such significance tests unreliable, but 
because inclusion of the product interaction improves model estimation even in the absence of 
interaction in the data generating process (Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey, 2010, 2016; Rainey, 
2016). We carry out and report various methods for estimating and visualising the direction 
and importance of the interactions.  
We control for the same individual level variables as in the network turnout model and the 
dyadic variable capturing whether or not the discussant invited the respondent to go to vote 
together. This variable helps us differentiate between the effect of normative pressure and inter-
personal mobilization. However, arguably, this might partly reflect a norm of voting: if you 
ask someone to vote, you are signalling not only that you will vote yourself but also that you 
believe the person you ask should also vote. Consequently, including this provides a tough test 
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for the impact of social norms, although the possibility of endogeneity remains. This is 
discussed further below.   
 
Results 
Table 1 shows the results of the network model of turnout and provides support for hypotheses 
1 and 2. Controlling for a wide range of network and individual characteristics, including civic 
duty, both empirical expectations and normative expectations have an independent effect on 
the probability of voting in the European Parliament elections. This is true across all sizes for 
network with the size of the effect being smaller in larger networks. This is most likely because 
where respondents have only one or two discussants; these are likely to be relatively more 
influential and to be more likely to be spouses or other close family. Moreover, for all network 
sizes, empirical expectations appear to be more important than normative expectations. To 
illustrate this more clearly we can visualise the predicted probability of voting from the three-
discussant model by both the number of discussants who voted and the number who approve 
(Figure 1). We see that for any given number of discussants that voted – that is holding 
empirical expectations constant – there is an increase in turnout according to the level of 
normative expectations (how may discussants care about voting).   
 
Figure 1. Probability of voting by number of discussants who vote and who care whether 
respondent votes in three person networks (when number of discussants=3).  
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Table 1. Logistic Model of European Parliament Election Turnout by Empirical and Normative 
Expectations 
Variables One 
Discussant 
   β       SE 
Two 
Discussants 
   β       SE 
Three 
Discussants 
   β       SE 
Constant -3.76*  0.29 -3.43*  0.37 -3.01*  0.25 
Network Variables       
Empirical Expectations   1.80*  0.09  1.15*  0.07  0.74*  0.03 
Normative Expectations  0.86*  0.09   0.47*  0.06   0.42*  0.03  
Discussant Asked You To Vote  0.56*  0.12  1.03*  0.14  1.04*  0.10 
Respondent Variables       
Overall Party Contact  0.40*   0.09  0.73*   0.10  0.53*   0.07 
Discuss Politics  0.06*   0.02  0.01     0.03  0.04*   0.02 
Political Attention (lagged)  0.06*  0.02  0.07*  0.03  0.09*  0.02 
Efficacy don’t understand (lagged) -0.09*  0.04 -0.10*  0.05 -0.12*  0.03 
Party ID & Strength (Combined) (lagged)  0.23*  0.05  0.17*  0.06  0.15*  0.04 
Civic Duty (Personal Norms) (lagged)  0.47*  0.04  0.42*  0.05  0.39*  0.03 
Female -0.43*  0.08 -0.42*  0.09 -0.48*  0.07 
Age Categories: Under 26       
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Age 26-35  0.62*  0.19  0.25    0.23  0.22    0.14 
Age 36-45  0.89*  0.19  0.61*  0.22  0.60*  0.14 
Age 46-55  1.04*  0.19  0.89*  0.22  0.78*  0.13 
Age 56-65  1.28*  0.18  0.90*  0.21  0.92*  0.13 
Age 66 plus  1.60*  0.19  1.01*  0.22  1.15*  0.13 
Education: All Others       
Degree or More  0.10    0.08  0.27*  0.09  0.20*  0.07 
Model Fit       
Chi-Square <0.05 2177.06* 1445.61* 2849.34* 
Log Likelihood -2318.20 -1698.86 -3361.76 
McFadden R2 0.32 0.30 0.30 
AIC 4670.40 3431.73 6757.53 
N 5616 4336 11070 
*Significant <0.05; Data is unweighted.  
 
 
Figure 2 suggests that the impact of both empirical and normative expectations vary according 
to the level of the other, in keeping with compression interaction common in logistic regression 
models (Nagler, 1991). In order to assess the relative importance of each we plot the average 
marginal effect of both variables across the full range (0-3) of the other variable and 
superimpose these on the same chart (Figure 2). Thus in the normative expectations plot the x-
axis represents the count of discussants who voted and in the empirical expectations plot, the 
x-axis represents count of discussants who care whether the respondent votes. We see that at 
all values of these variables, the average marginal effect of empirical expectations is larger than 
that of normative expectations. However, as Table 1 indicates both variables have substantial 
effects on the probability of voting even after controlling for personal normative beliefs and a 
host of other correlates of individual turnout. For example, when the respondent has one 
discussant that cares whether s/he votes, each discussant who votes themselves increases 
turnout by approximately 7%. Similarly, for a respondent who has one discussant who voted, 
each discussant who cares whether s/he votes increases turnout by around 6%. The overall 
average marginal effect of empirical expectations for respondents who have three discussants 
is 7% and for normative expectations is 4%.  
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Figure 2. Comparison of Average marginal effect of Normative Expectations by 
Empirical Expectations; and Empirical Expectations by Normative Expectations 
(respondents with 3 discussants only).  
 
 
 
As explained above, to test hypothesis 3 (that relationship type moderates the impact of 
normative and empirical expectations) and hypothesis 4 (that there is an interaction between 
empirical and normative expectations) we stratified our analyses so that we have a separate 
model for each type of relationship (see Table 2). We see that the effect of the control variables 
is fairly consistent across models. It is important to note the impact of the ‘asked to vote’ 
variable. Inter-personal influence might take the form of direct mobilization or companion 
effects (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2012) and not require any normative component. Simply being 
‘invited’ to vote by a family member appears to be an important predictor of turnout, but the 
same is not true for non-family members. Voting together is very much a household 
phenomenon (Bhatti, Fieldhouse and Hansen, 2018) and it is therefore not surprising that the 
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invitation to vote together is powerful only among family members. Nevertheless, even 
allowing for this, both injunctive and descriptive norms are important. Moreover, although it 
might be reasonable to assume that the effect of descriptive and injunctive norms might be 
mediated by mobilization, especially by a spouse, it is worth noting that when we ran the same 
model without the inclusion of the ‘asked to vote’ variable, the parameter estimated for 
empirical and normative expectations are barely changed.6 The only instance where controlling 
for personal mobilization makes a non-negligible difference is in the case of spousal empirical 
expectations. That is, when we control for being asked to vote by a spouse, the effect of 
empirical expectations is slightly smaller. Given that spouses frequently vote together, it is 
perhaps surprising that adding this control does not make even more difference. In short, we 
do not find very much evidence that the injunctive or descriptive norms are being mediated by 
(or attributable to) interpersonal mobilization.  
Turning to those parameter estimates for the norms variables, what is clear is that empirical 
expectations - or descriptive norms – are especially important for spouses and rather less 
important for other relationship types. By contrast, the effect of normative expectations is more 
consistent across relationship types, albeit slightly weaker for neighbours and co-workers. 
Normative expectations are actually stronger for family members other than spouse – most 
likely children or parents. Overall, the magnitude of the effect of normative expectations is on 
a par with empirical expectations except in the case of spouses.  
 
Table 2. Logistic Model of Dyad Relationship Turnout by Normative and Empirical Expectations  
                                                          
6 The estimates for empirical expectations in the same model without ‘Asked to vote’ were as follows (values 
from model in table 2 in parentheses: Spouse 2.74 (2.58); other family 0.96 (0.93); friends 0.82 (0.82); and Other 
0.92 (0.93). For normative expectations the estimates were:  Spouse 0.69  (0.67); other family 1.08 (1.07); friends 
0.64 (0.64); and  other 0.55 (0.55) 
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*Significant <0.05; Data is unweighted.  
 
The overall relative importance of empirical and normative expectations is illustrated in Figure 
3, which shows the average marginal effects of each variable by relationship type. The plot 
highlights the special importance of empirical expectations for spouses, whilst confirming the 
importance of both empirical and normative expectation for all types of political discussant. 
The respondent who has a spouse who voted is, on average, approximately 36 percentage points 
more likely to vote than one who has a spouse who does not. This is consistent with research 
showing a high level of correspondence in turnout in household especially among spouses 
(Cutts and Fieldhouse, 2009) and, although we control for direct inter-personal mobilization 
(asked to vote), there may be a variety of reasons for this correspondence that are not normative.  
Variables Spouse 
   β       SE 
Family 
   β       SE 
Friends 
   β        SE 
Neigh/Other 
    β       SE 
Constant -2.40*  0.26 -2.01*  0.21 -2.26*  0.21 -1.64*  0.26 
Network Variables     
Empirical Expectations  2.58*  0.09  0.93*  0.08  0.82*  0.08  0.93*  0.10 
Normative Expectations  0.67*  0.09  1.07*  0.10  0.64*  0.10  0.55*  0.15 
Empirical Exp*Normative Exp  0.40*  0.14 -0.07    0.14  0.23    0.14 -0.25    0.20 
Discussant Asked You To Vote  0.62*  0.10  0.57*  0.16  0.01    0.22 -0.39    0.23 
Respondent Variables     
Overall Party Contact  0.60*  0.07  0.66*  0.06  0.62*  0.06  0.49*  0.08 
Discuss Politics  0.11*  0.02  0.13*  0.02  0.13*  0.02  0.13*  0.02 
Political Attention (lagged)  0.08*  0.02  0.07*  0.02  0.12*  0.02  0.06*  0.02 
Efficacy don’t understand (lagged) -0.10*  0.03 -0.11*  0.03 -0.08*  0.03 -0.17*  0.04 
Party ID & Strength (Combined) 
(lagged) 
 0.19*  0.04  0.21*  0.04  0.18*  0.04  0.32*  0.04 
Civic Duty (Personal Norms) (lagged)  0.74*  0.08  0.90*  0.07  0.94*  0.07  0.97*  0.08 
Female -0.43*  0.06 -0.24*  0.06 -0.22*  0.06 -0.26*  0.07 
Age Categories: Under 26     
Age 26-35  0.21    0.19  0.19    0.13  0.15    0.13  0.33    0.18 
Age 36-45  0.31    0.19  0.41*  0.12  0.67*  0.13  0.56*  0.18 
Age 46-55  0.38*  0.19  0.77*  0.12  0.83*  0.13  0.88*  0.17 
Age 56-65  0.36*  0.18  0.91*  0.11  0.93*  0.12  1.01*  0.17 
Age 66 plus  0.43*  0.19  1.18*  0.12  1.19*  0.12  1.45*  0.19 
Education: All Others     
Degree or More  0.23*   0.07  0.26*   0.06  0.17*   0.06  0.14    0.08 
Model Fit     
Chi-Square <0.05 3098.32* 1607.26* 1331.29* 944.82* 
Log Likelihood -3531.44 -3840.70 -3745.24 -2517.52 
McFadden R2 0.44 0.22 0.20 0.20 
AIC 7098.89 7717.41 7526.48 5071.05 
N 12600 9805 9713 5929 
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On average, having a spouse who cares whether you vote raises turnout by about eight 
percentage points. For other relationship types, empirical and normative expectations have a 
much more similar impact. Indeed, outside of spousal relationships, social approval of voting 
is equally as important as descriptive norms.  
Figure 3. Average marginal effects of dyadic normative and empirical expectations by 
relationship type. 
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Assessing interactive effects 
It is widely recognised that the statistical significance and point estimates of interactions are 
problematic to interpret (Ai and Norton, 2003; Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey, 2010). In order to 
understand the interactive effects of two independent variables in a binary logit model it is 
important to examine the marginal effects of each variable as the other varies. To assess the 
joint effect of empirical and normative expectations on turnout (hypothesis 4) we therefore plot 
the predicted probabilities of voting by empirical and normative expectations for each 
relationship type (Figure 4). It is clear from the plot that there are notable slopes and gaps 
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across all relationship types demonstrating the impact of normative and empirical expectations 
respectively. However, the evidence for an interactive relationship is mixed.  
 
Figure 4. Predictive margins Normative and empirical expectations (dyadic models) 
  
  
  
 
 
The predictive margin for spouses shown in Figure 4 appears to suggest an interactive 
relationship between normative and empirical expectations but not in in a way consistent with 
the positive interaction as shown in Table 2. Rather, the impact of normative expectations 
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seems to be smaller in the presence of empirical expectations: the difference between having a 
spouse who cares about voting is roughly six percentage points if they vote themselves 
compared with fifteen if they did not.  In other words, contrary to hypothesis 4,  if a spouse 
votes themselves, whether or not they care about whether their partner votes seems to matter 
less.  
This also appears to be to be true (to a lesser extent) for other family but not friends and 
neighbours/co-workers. However, taken together, the plots and the interaction effects suggest 
that the primary driver in this interaction is compression. If a spouse votes (empirical 
expectations =1) the chance of the respondent voting is already very high. If the probability of 
voting P(Y) is a function of an unbounded latent utility for voting (Y*) then we would expect 
that when a spouse votes the average latent utility for voting is much higher. Assuming (as is 
the case in our data) the mean probability of voting  is greater than 0.5 then, depending on the 
distribution of Y*, it will be less likely that an increase in Y* due to social pressure will lead 
to the utility threshold required for voting to be exceeded  (Nagler, 1991; Berry, DeMeritt and 
Esarey, 2010). In other words, there is less chance social pressure will matter if your partner 
votes because it is more than likely you would have voted anyway.  
As noted above, in a model containing a product interaction  we need to consider both that 
product interaction (which in this case  is positive) as well as the effect of compression (Berry, 
DeMeritt and Esarey, 2016; Rainey, 2016). Examination of the evidence shown in Appendix 1 
including the second difference in marginal effects and the change in model fit suggest that 
there is an interactive relationship in the case of spouses and other family, but not so for other 
relationship types (see Appendix Table 1).  
In sum, the preferred models (with a product interaction) suggest that injunctive norms matter 
less if a spouse or family member votes themselves (compared to when the discussant does not 
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vote) insofar as social pressure is less likely to be decisive in the voting decision. Indeed 
spousal voting is very often a sufficient condition for voting (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2012).  
 
Discussion 
In this article, for first time, we have employed network data drawn from a sample of the 
general population to examine the relative importance of injunctive and descriptive norms for 
voter turnout; the extent to which their effects are interactive or additive; and how their 
influence varies across different social relationships. We show that descriptive and injunctive 
norms of voting are closely related but allowing for this we find that both play an important 
role in voter turnout. Whilst on the face of it our results are consistent with the orthodox view 
that that descriptive norms are more important than injunctive norms, there are two reasons 
why this is not the conclusion that we draw.  
First, whilst our research used the best available network data and our models controlled for a 
large array of potential confounding variables including civic duty, inter-personal mobilization, 
political interest and party identification; the processes of normative influence are, by 
definition, subject to endogeneity (people influence each other). For example, respondents may 
take their own voting behaviour as evidence of what others most likely do, or may be more 
likely to select discussion partners with similar political tastes (Bello and Rolfe, 2014). 
Moreover, just as discussants influence respondents, respondents also influence discussants. 
This is problematic for the dyadic measure of descriptive norms since, what that measures is 
simply whether the respondent believes the discussant voted. Therefore, when analysing the 
effect of this on the respondent’s turnout, what we capture is the correspondence in turnout. 
Previous research has shown such levels of correspondence to be high (Cutts and Fieldhouse, 
2009) and to have a large causal component (Bhatti, Fieldhouse and Hansen, 2018), yet that 
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correspondence may be the result of influence in either direction. Whilst we explicitly 
controlled for inter-personal mobilization and companion effects, the effects of co-ordination 
and imitation may run from respondent to discussant or from discussant to respondent. It is 
therefore prudent to assume that the actual effect of descriptive norms is only half that of the 
estimated effect size for our empirical expectations variable. In contrast, whilst there are other 
potential sources of endogeneity - for example, if respondents infer that discussants approve of 
their voting because they themselves care about voting – there is no equivalent double counting 
of the effect of normative expectations: the survey question explicitly refers to social approval 
of the discussant and not the reverse.  
Second, our findings clearly demonstrate that the relative importance of descriptive norms is 
limited to spouses. Given that couple are most likely to observe each other’s voting behaviour 
and frequently make joint decisions to vote (Glaser, 1959; Cutts and Fieldhouse, 2009; 
Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2012)  this is not altogether surprising.  Across all other relationship 
types, injunctive norms have an impact on voter turnout that is equally as large as descriptive 
norms, and considerably larger if we assume, as argued above, that the effects of the descriptive 
norms are only half their estimated size. Whilst we cannot eradicate all possible sources of 
endogeneity in the effect of both descriptive and injunctive norms on turnout, having set a 
tough test of their impact through our choice of control variables, we can be reasonably 
confident in making such a relative assessment.  
Our findings regarding the interactive effect of injunctive and descriptive norms were nuanced. 
There is some evidence that empirical and normative expectations combined in a complex way, 
with the effect of social pressure being smaller when a discussant voted. However, we noted 
that this largely due the fact that, for spouses in particular, there was not much room for those 
with partners who voted to be influenced by social pressure as their likelihood of voting was 
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already very high. If anything, this ‘compression’ was offset somewhat by an increased 
sensitivity to social pressure from spouses who voted.  
These findings have important implications for the study of voter turnout and political 
behaviour more generally. We should not assume that it is possible to measure the effects of 
normative influences on voter turnout simply by relying on the notion of civic duty. Clearly 
internalised normative beliefs are important, but voter turnout is conditional on the norms, 
beliefs and actions of social referents, especially those who are socially most intimate. 
Moreover, we should also not assume that such normative influence is purely behavioural or 
descriptive. Whilst, in the case of married couples, it is clear that whether or not a spouse votes 
themselves is crucial for voter turnout, for all other types of political discussant injunctive 
norms are equally important (or perhaps more so). It appears that political discussant partners 
are inclined to not only ‘do as you do’ but also ‘do as you say’. In the age of social media and 
the proliferation of political information, political discussion with social intimates is still a 
crucial ingredient creating the social norms which underpin political participation.  
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